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Summary. We study the problem of a risk-neutral decision-maker who has to choose among
two alternative investment projects of diﬀerent scales under output price uncertainty. We
provide parameter restrictions under which the optimal investment strategy is not a trigger
strategy and the optimal investment region is dichotomous. Whenever the decision-maker has
the opportunity to switch from the smaller scale to the larger scale project, the dichotomy of
the investment region can persist even when the volatility of the output price process becomes
large.
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The literature on irreversible investment under uncertainty pioneered by Arrow and Fisher
[3] and Henry [15] is based on the premise that three factors mainly inﬂuence the investment
decision. First, there is some uncertainty about the cash-ﬂows that the investment project
will generate. Next, investment is at least partially irreversible, in the sense that investment
expenditures cannot be fully recovered. Last, there is some degree of ﬂexibility in the timing
of investment, which is valuable because it gives the decision-maker the option to wait for new
information. The loss of this option value when investment occurs represents an additional
opportunity cost of investment. As a result, investment options are exercised signiﬁcantly
above the point at which expected discounted cash-ﬂows cover sunk capital costs, in contrast
with the usual net present value rule.
In the benchmark case of a single indivisible project, the optimal investment policy can be
mathematically determined as the solution of an optimal stopping problem. The prototype
of this approach is the model of McDonald and Siegel [24], in which the underlying value of
the investment project evolves as a geometric Brownian motion. Under this formulation, the
optimal investment strategy is a trigger strategy. Speciﬁcally, the investment option should
be exercised at the ﬁr s tt i m ea tw h i c ht h ev a l u eo ft h ei n v e s t m e n tp r o j e c tr e a c h e sac r i t i c a l
threshold that can be explicitly computed using standard smooth-ﬁt techniques (Dixit and
Pindyck [10]).
The large and rapidly growing literature on real options has recently emphasized the
sequential nature of investment decisions (Majd and Pindyck [23], Bar-Ilan and Strange
[4]), the importance of incremental capacity choice (Pindyck [26], Kandel and Pearson [17]),
and addressed issues like entry and exit decisions (Dixit [8]), costly reversibility (Abel and
Eberly [1]), technology or optimal risk adoption (Farzin, Huisman and Kort [12], Alvarez and
Stenbacka [2]), and learning (D´ ecamps, Mariotti and Villeneuve [6]).
In this paper, we leave aside these complex and meaningful extensions of the theory
and revisit an old simple problem, namely the choice between mutually exclusive investment
projects under uncertainty. Despite its simplicity, this is still a topical question, as illustrated
for instance by Dias’ [7] recent survey of real options in the petroleum industry.
The starting point of our analysis is the model of Dixit [9]. In his model, a decision-
maker has to choose among alternative projects of diﬀerent scales. The instantaneous cash-
ﬂow generated by any of these projects is a linear function of a single geometric Brownian
motion that represents the dynamics of the output price, and of the constant output ﬂow of
the project. Projects with larger sunk capital costs are associated with larger output ﬂows
and, once installed, a project incurs no operating costs. When the decision-maker decides
to invest, he naturally selects the project with the highest net present value. Therefore, his
underlying payoﬀ function is the upper envelope of the family of aﬃne functions representing
the net present values of investing in each project given the current output price.
Dixit’s solution to this problem relies on a simple adaptation of the single project case
studied by McDonald and Siegel [24]. Speciﬁcally, he argues that each project should be
evaluated separately, and that the solution to the investment problem is simply to choose the
project with the highest option value. As an illustration, suppose there are two projects, 1
and 2. One could for instance think of these two projects as alternative ways of producing
electricity, by using a gas or a nuclear technology. Project 1 entails a lower sunk capital cost
and generates a lower output ﬂow than project 2. Separate evaluation of these two projects
leads to two option values, and associated critical investment thresholds p1 and p2 for the
output price, which is here the relevant state variable. According to Dixit, the solution of
1the investment problem is then twofold.
(i) If the initial output price is low enough, it is optimal to invest in the project that has
the highest option value, at the ﬁrst time at which the corresponding threshold p1 or
p2 is reached by the output price.
(ii) For values of the initial output price greater than this optimal threshold, the project
with the highest net present value is selected and investment is immediate.
While our solution coincides with Dixit’s in case (i), we ﬁnd that (ii) is questionable. Our
counter-argument is as follows. Suppose that project 1 has a higher option value than project
2, which typically occurs if project 1 generates only a marginally lower output ﬂow than
project 2, but entails a signiﬁcantly lower sunk capital cost. In particular, when the current
output price is p1, the decision-maker is strictly better oﬀ investing in project 1 than in
project 2, so that p1 is below the indiﬀerence point for which the net present values of the
two projects are equal. We show that it is never optimal to invest in either project when
the output price is at this indiﬀerence point, thus contradicting part (ii) of Dixit’s solution.
The reason is that the underlying payoﬀ function of the decision-maker is not diﬀerentiable
at the indiﬀerence point, where it exhibits an upward derivative jump. Using a local time
argument, we show that this implies the optimality of delaying investment for values of the
current output price in the neighborhood of this point.
As a result, when the option value of investing in project 1 is higher than that of investing
in project 2, the optimal investment strategy is no longer a trigger strategy, and the optimal
investment region in the state space is not connected. Instead, the optimal investment region
is dichotomous. Speciﬁcally, there are two critical thresholds p3 and p4 around the indiﬀerence
point such that if the current output price lies in [p1,p 3], it is optimal to invest in project 1,
while if the current output price lies in [p4,∞), it is optimal to invest in project 2. It should
be noted that, for values of the output price below p3, Dixit’s solution remains correct. In
particular, when the initial output price is below p1, it is optimal to wait until the output
price reaches p1, and then to invest in project 1. By contrast, the intermediate region (p3,p 4)
is an inaction region in which the decision-maker waits to see in which project to invest.
When the initial output price lies in (p3,p 4), two scenarios can therefore occur. If the output
price raises to p4 before hitting p3, the decision-maker will invest in project 2. By contrast,
if the output price falls to p3 before hitting p4, the decision-maker will invest in project 1.
Under these circumstances, the eventual project choice is therefore path-dependent.
The existence of the intermediate inaction region (p3,p 4) implies that, in striking contrast
with most standard real option models, it can be optimal to invest in a project even though
the instantaneous proﬁt ﬂow associated to this project falls. Investing in project 1 when
the output price falls down to p3 is optimal because p3 is higher than the output price
threshold p1 above which it would be optimal to invest in project 1 if that were the only
investment option available, and because it would be too costly to wait until the threshold
p4 is reached to invest in project 2–in other terms, “a bird in the hand is worth two in the
bush.” Moreover, there is a region of the state space in which it is optimal to delay investment
while it would be optimal to invest if only one project, 1 or 2, were available. This illustrates
again the interaction between the two investment options, which is not taken into account by
Dixit’s solution. Adding a new investment option to an existing one increases the demand for
information and creates an additional incentive to delay investment, even if, when evaluated
separately, the second option is dominated by the ﬁrst.
As pointed out above, a suﬃcient condition for the dichotomy of the optimal investment
region is that project 1 generates only a marginally lower output ﬂow than project 2, but
2entails a signiﬁcantly lower sunk capital cost. Alternatively, one could ﬁx the output and
cost parameters of the model, and investigate under which conditions on the underlying
output price process the optimal investment region is dichotomous. It turns out that, if the
volatility of the output price process is high enough, the optimal investment region is never
dichotomous and, no matter the current output price, it is never optimal to invest in project
1. Thus, holding the output and cost parameters of the model ﬁxed, the dichotomy of the
optimal investment region requires a relatively low volatility of the output price process. More
generally, greater volatility systematically leads to the adoption of larger projects. However,
this result holds because in Dixit’s original model, the decision-maker cannot switch from
one project to the other. By contrast, we show that, whenever the decision-maker has the
option to switch from project 1 to project 2 by incurring the corresponding sunk capital cost,
there are output and cost parameters such that the dichotomy of the optimal investment
region is preserved and investment in project 1 occurs with positive probability even for a
very high volatility of the output price process. This suggests that greater volatility does not
systematically lead to the adoption of larger projects when the decision-maker has the option
to increase the scale of his operations as price conditions improve.
2 The basic model
2.1 The investment problem
Our basic setup and notation are directly in line with Dixit [9]. We simplify his model by
assuming that only two alternative investment projects are available. Time is continuous,
and labelled by t ≥ 0. A single risk-neutral decision-maker can invest in one of two projects,
i ∈ {1,2},o fd i ﬀerent scales. Project 2 generates a higher output ﬂow than project 1, but
entails a higher sunk capital cost. Formally, each project i generates an output ﬂow Xi > 0,
with X2 >X 1, and entails a sunk capital cost Ki > 0, with K2 >K 1. A project once
installed incurs no operating costs. The instantaneous cash-ﬂow generated by project i is
PtXi,w h e r eP = {Pt;t ≥ 0} is a geometric Brownian motion with drift µ and volatility σ,
dPt = µPtdt + σPtdWt; t ≥ 0,
that represents the dynamics of output price. The decision-maker discounts future revenues
and costs at a constant rate ρ >µ . A project once installed lasts for ever and, in the basic
version of the model, there is no option to switch from the smaller scale project 1 to the
larger scale project 2 once the former has been installed. Hence, for a current value p of the




− Ki; p ≥ 0. (1)
When contemplating investment, the decision-maker will select the project which generates
the highest net expected discounted proﬁt, given the current output price. So the value of
investing is given by the upper envelope of V1 and V2:
V (p)=m a x {V1(p),V 2(p)}; p ≥ 0. (2)
We denote by:
˜ p =
(ρ − µ)(K2 − K1)
X2 − X1
(3)
3the output price level at which the decision-maker is indiﬀerent between investing in either
project. In particular, V2(p) ≥ V1(p) if and only if p ≥ ˜ p.N o t et h a tV is not diﬀerentiable at
the indiﬀerence point ˜ p,w i t hD+V (˜ p)=X2/(ρ − µ) >X 1/(ρ − µ)=D−V (˜ p).
Let T P be the set of stopping times adapted to the ﬁltration generated by the output
price P. The decision-maker’s investment problem can then be written as:







; p ≥ 0, (4)
where the superscript p in P
p
t reﬂects the dependence of P on its initial value p. Let us denote
by S = {p>0 |V (p)=V (p)} the stopping region for (4), and by τS =i n f {t ≥ 0 | P
p
t ∈ S}
the associated stopping time. Since ρ >µ , the process {e−ρtV(P
p
t );t ≥ 0} is uniformly
integrable and converges almost surely to 0 (see Appendix). A suﬃcient condition for τS to
be an optimal stopping time for (4) is then that S be non-empty (El Karoui [11]). We have
the following result.
Proposition 2.1 The stopping region S for (4) is non-empty.
Having shown the existence of a solution to (4), we now characterize the stopping region
S. Before that, it will be helpful to summarize Dixit’s approach to this problem.
2.2 Dixit’s solution
The solution proposed by Dixit to (4) is as follows. Relying on Itˆ o’s lemma, he argues that,





















σ2ξ(ξ − 1) + µξ − ρ =0 . (5)
T h eo p t i m a lv a l u eo fB is determined as the highest B such that the contact condition
V (p)=Bpβ is satisﬁed for some p ≥ 0. Since V is an upper envelope of aﬃne functions and
Bpβ is a convex function of p as β > 1, the contact between V and V cannot occur at the
indiﬀerence point ˜ p. Thus one needs only to compute the tangency points of functions of the
form Bipβ with each of the aﬃne functions Vi, and select the one with the highest Bi.T h a t

































i is the largest.
Then, if the initial output price p is below p¯ i, the decision-maker should wait until the output
price reaches p¯ i, and then invest in project ¯ i. If the initial output price p is above p¯ i,t h e
decision-maker should immediately invest in the best available project. In other terms, the
stopping region S is of the form [p¯ i,∞), and for any p ∈ S, the decision-maker should invest
in the project for which Vi(p) is the largest. In particular, the optimal investment strategy
would then be a simple trigger strategy, as when a single investment project is available
(McDonald and Siegel [24]).
Remark. There is a direct link between Dixit’s solution and that of the problem of
investing in a single project with output ﬂow Xi and sunk capital cost Ki:







; p ≥ 0. (10)
Standard computations (Dixit and Pindyck [10]) show that the solution to (10) consists to
invest as soon as the output price reaches pi,a n dt h a tVi(p)=Bipβ for p ≤ pi. Equivalently,
Vi(p)=

    






if p ≤ pi,
pXi
ρ − µ
− Ki if p>p i.
(11)
Conditions (6) and (7) correspond respectively to the usual value-matching and smooth-
pasting conditions for (10). Hence, Dixit’s solution essentially consists to evaluate separately
the two investment options on each project, and then to select the project with the highest
option value.
2.3 A counter-argument
To rule out the relatively uninteresting case in which, no matter the current output price, it
is never optimal to invest in project 1, and therefore τ =i n f {t ≥ 0 | P
p
t ≥ p2} is an optimal















According to Dixit’s solution, the stopping region S should then be [p1,∞). In particular,
p1 < ˜ p and thus the indiﬀerence point ˜ p belongs to S (otherwise, it would never be optimal
to invest in project 1). However, one has the following result.
Proposition 2.2 The indiﬀerence point ˜ p never belongs to the stopping region S for (4).
The proof of this result is technical, and relies on a local time argument based on the
Itˆ o—Tanaka—Meyer formula (Karatzas and Shreve [18, Theorem 3.7.1]). The intuition for
this result is in line with the heuristic argument used by Dixit and Pindyck [10, Chapter 4,
Appendix C] to justify the standard smooth-pasting condition. Suppose the current output
price is at the indiﬀerence point ˜ p. By waiting for a small interval of time dt, the decision-
maker can observe the evolution of P and choose to invest on either side of ˜ p. The average
payoﬀ thus obtained is greater than the payoﬀ from investing at the indiﬀerence point itself
since the payoﬀ function V deﬁned by (2) is not diﬀerentiable at the indiﬀerence point, with
5D+V (˜ p) >D −V (˜ p). This remains true even though this average payoﬀ must be discounted,
because, by the standard property of the Brownian motion, the expected gain from delaying
investment is proportional to [D+V (˜ p) − D−V (˜ p)]
√
dt, while the cost due to discounting is
of order dt.W h e ndt is small the former eﬀect dominates. As a result, the decision-maker is
always better oﬀ delaying investment when the current output price is ˜ p rather than investing
in either project. As shown below, this implies that whenever (12) holds, the stopping region
S is not connected, and the optimal investment strategy is not a trigger strategy, contrary
to Dixit’s solution.
Remark. An alternative way of deriving Proposition 2.2 is as follows. From optimal
stopping theory, the process {e−ρtV(P
p
t );t ≥ 0} is a supermartingale (El Karoui [11]). This
implies that:
AV ≤ 0




σ2p2D2g + µpDg − ρg (13)
(Jaillet, Lamberton and Lapeyre [16]). In particular, on the interior of the stopping region
S, one has, in the sense of distributions:
AV = AV ≤ 0. (14)
The distribution AV can be explicitly computed as follows:




where the Dirac mass δ˜ p reﬂects the derivative jump of V at ˜ p. Suppose now that S =[ p1,∞),
as prescribed by Dixit’s solution under (12). Then ˜ p>p 1 and, for any non-negative function
φ ∈ C∞




(−pX1 + ρK1)φ(p)dp +
Z ˜ p+ε
˜ p




Choosing ε small enough and φ(˜ p) large enough, it follows that hAV,φi> 0, which contradicts
(14). It follows that the stopping region S cannot be of the prescribed form.
2.4 The optimal investment region
We are now ready to state and prove our main result.
Theorem 2.1 Suppose that (12) holds. Then:
(i) The stopping region S for (4) is the union of two disjoint intervals [p1,p 3] and [p4,∞),
where p1 is given by (8) and p3 < ˜ p<p 4. If the current output price lies in [p1,p 3],
it is optimal to invest in project 1, while if it lies in [p4,∞), it is optimal to invest in
project 2;
1Recall that a distribution T on an open set Ω ⊂ R++ is a linear form on the space C
∞
K (Ω)o fi n ﬁnitely
diﬀerentiable functions on Ω with compact support that satisﬁes the following property: for any sequence {φn}
of functions in C
∞
K (Ω) whose supports are contained in a ﬁxed compact subset of Ω, and such that the sequence
{D
kφn} converges uniformly to 0 for every k ∈ N,t h es e q u e n c e{hT,φni} converges to 0 (see for instance
Ziemer [28, Deﬁnition 1.7.1]). The notation T ≤ 0m e a n st h a thT,φi≤ 0 for any non-negative φ ∈ C
∞
K (Ω).
6(ii) The value function V for (4) is continuously diﬀerentiable on R++ and satisﬁes the
following variational inequalities:
AV ≤ 0, (15)
V ≥ V, (16)
(V − V )AV =0 , (17)
where the operator A is given by (13). In particular, V coincides with V1 on [0,p 3],






As shown on Figure 1, the value function V coincides with V1 on [0,p 1], then takes oﬀ
from V1 on (p3,p 4) and touches down V2 at the point p4. On the interval [0,p 1], V is of the
form B1pβ,w h e r eB1 is given by (9). On the interval [p3,p 4], it follows from (15)—(17) that

















is the negative root of the quadratic equation (5). The coeﬃcients A and B,a sw e l la s
the critical investment thresholds p3 and p4, can be found in principle by solving the value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions (18)—(21), although no analytic solution is available.
–Insert Figure 1 here–
The key insight of our result is that, whenever (12) holds, the optimal investment strategy
is not a trigger strategy, and the optimal investment region is dichotomous. It should be noted
that Dixit’s solution remains valid on the segment [0,p 1] of the state space. If the output price
initially belongs to that region, it is optimal to wait until it reaches p1 to invest in project 1.
However, our solution departs from Dixit’s in that there is a range of prices (p3,p 4) around
the indiﬀerence point ˜ p in which it is optimal for the decision-maker to wait in order to decide
in which project to invest. Note that if project 2 were not immediately available, it would
be optimal to invest in project 1 in that region. Thus delay in the region (p3,p 4)r e ﬂects the
added opportunity to invest in project 2.
It is easy to verify that, due to the added convex component Apα in the value function
on the interval [p3,p 4], the threshold p2 cannot satisfy the system formed by equations (19)
and (21). This shows that if (12) holds, the inequality p4 ≥ p2–which holds necessarily as
7otherwise, when the current output price is p4, the decision-maker would be better oﬀ delaying
investment until the output price reaches p2 and only then invest in project 2, rather than
investing straight away in project 2–is actually a strict inequality.2 As a result, if (12) holds,
then for values of the output price in (p2,p 4), the decision-maker chooses to delay investment
although he would have invested immediately if only one project, 1 or 2, were available. This
illustrates the interaction between the two investment options: the decision-maker is ready to
delay further investment in project 2 because he knows that he will have the option to invest
in project 1 if the output price deteriorates too much. Note that this remains true despite the
fact that, on the interval [0, ˜ p), the option of investing in project 1 uniformly dominates that
of investing in project 2 when these two options are evaluated separately, that is, V1 > V2 on
this price range.
Numerical example. To illustrate our results, we adopt Dixit and Pindyck’s [10, §5.4]
choice of parameters, which amounts in our setup to µ =0 ,ρ =0 .04 and σ =0 .2 (at annual
rates). This in turn yields α = −1a n dβ =2 . N e x t ,w eﬁx X1 =1a n dK1 = 10, so
that p1 =0 .8 by (8). For parameter values for X2 and K2 that satisfy (12), one can then




3 =2 5 p3 − 10,
Ap−1
4 + Bp2
4 =2 5 p4X2 − K2,
−Ap−2
3 +2 Bp3 =2 5 ,
−Ap−2
4 +2 Bp4 =2 5 X2.
Finally, one can use the values for A and B thus obtained to evaluate the percentage gain
∆ =[ V(˜ p) − V (˜ p)]/V (˜ p) from optimally delaying investment at the indiﬀerence point ˜ p,
relative to investing at this point as prescribed by Dixit’s solution. The following table
depicts our ﬁndings for three sets of parameters X2 and K2 that satisfy (12).
–Insert Table 1 here–
Table 1 suggests that the wider the gap between the output ﬂows and investment costs
associated to projects 1 and 2, the larger is the inaction region (p3,p 4), and the higher is the
percentage gain from inaction relative to investing at the indiﬀerence point ˜ p.3 As the last
column of Table 1 indicates, the latter can be signiﬁcant and thus represent a substantial
share of the option value. Therefore, the dichotomy of the investment region can have a
crucial impact on the evaluation of the investment option.
2.5 Discussion
Condition (12) is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the optimal investment region to be
dichotomous in Dixit’s model when there are two alternative projects. For a ﬁxed value of
2A similar computation shows that, when (12) holds, the threshold p1 cannot satisfy the system formed by
equations (18) and (20), which ensures that p1 <p 3.
3Note that in the inaction region (p3,p 4), the diﬀerence between the option value V and the investment
value V is maximal at the indiﬀerence point ˜ p.
8β, (12) holds if project 1 generates only a marginally lower output ﬂow than project 2, but
entails a signiﬁcantly lower sunk capital cost. If (12) does not hold, then the option value
of investing in project 2, V2, uniformly dominates the payoﬀ of investing in project 1, V1,s o
that it never pays to select project 1. It is worth noting that, whenever σ goes to inﬁnity and
thus β goes to 1, condition (12) is never satisﬁed as X1 <X 2. Thus, holding the output and
cost parameters of the model ﬁxed, the dichotomy of the optimal investment region requires
a relatively low volatility of the output price process. As we shall see, this is no longer the
case once one allows the decision-maker to switch from project 1 to project 2.
Examples of investment policies more complex than a simple trigger strategy abound in
the literature. The model of entry and exit by Dixit [8] generates a two-trigger strategy:
the critical output price above which it is optimal to enter an industry is higher than the
one below which it is optimal to exit from it. Similarly, Abel and Eberly [1] show that the
investment policy of a ﬁrm under costly reversibility is characterized by a range of inaction
in which it is optimal neither to purchase nor to sell capital. However, a common feature
of these and related papers is that the lower boundary of the inaction region corresponds
to a disinvestment decision. In our model, by contrast, both p3 and p4 correspond to an
investment decision, albeit in diﬀerent projects.
A striking feature of the optimal investment strategy is that it may be optimal to invest
in project 1 after a drop in the output price if the output price initially lies in (p3,p 4).
Rational investment in a down market can also be triggered by other factors. Competition is
one of them. Grenadier [14] develops a model of strategic exercise of investment options in
which competitors can simultaneously invest when the value of the investment goes down in
an attempt to avoid preemption. D´ ecamps, Mariotti and Villeneuve [6] show that a similar
phenomenon can occur in a single decision-maker context when the drift of the value process
is not known ex-ante. The decision to invest then depends on both the observed current value
of the project and the beliefs about the unknown drift. This generates path dependency in
the optimal investment strategy, and it may be rational to invest after a drop in the current
value of the investment project. As we have shown, this phenomenon can also result from
the interaction between several investment options.
Finally, although we have derived our results for the case of two alternative projects,
it is conceptually straightforward to extend them to an arbitrary number of projects with
output ﬂows X1,...,X N and sunk capital costs K1,...,K N ranked in increasing order. The
analogue of Proposition 2.2 is that it is never optimal to invest when the current output
price corresponds to a point of non-diﬀerentiability of the upper envelope of the net expected
discounted proﬁts of investing in each project. As soon as the option of investing in project
N does not dominate all the other investment options, the optimal investment strategy will
be characterized by several disconnected inaction regions, in which the decision-maker waits
in order to determine in which project to invest.
3P r o j e c t s w i t c h i n g
3.1 The investment problem
In this section, we modify Dixit’s [9] original setup by allowing the decision-maker to switch
from one project to the other by incurring the corresponding sunk capital cost. Since project
2 generates a higher output ﬂow than project 1, it is clear that it is never optimal to switch
from project 2, once installed, to project 1. Thus, for a current value p of the output price,
the net expected discounted proﬁt of investing in project 2 is given by V2(p)a sa b o v e . B y
9contrast, once project 1 is installed, it is optimal to switch to project 2 if the output price
becomes large enough, as we shall see below. The decision-maker’s investment problem can
then be written as:


















; p ≥ 0.
Here, τ1 denotes the ﬁr s tt i m ea tw h i c ht h ed e c i s i o n - m a k e ri n v e s t s ,w h i c h e v e rp r o j e c th e
selects, and τ2 ≥ τ1 denotes the ﬁr s tt i m ea tw h i c hh ei n v e s t si np r o j e c t2 . W es h a l ls o l v e
(22) by dynamic programming techniques. As a ﬁrst step, this requires computing the value
of investing sequentially in projects 1 and 2.
3.2 The switching option
To determine the value of investing in project 1, we must ﬁrst take into account the option
of switching later from project 1 to project 2. Speciﬁcally, for a current value p of the output
price, the net expected discounted proﬁt of investing in project 1 is given by:
V s











The optimal stopping problem in (23) is standard. In particular, V s
1 + K1 is continuously
diﬀerentiable on R++ and satisﬁes the following variational inequalities:
A(V s
1 + K1)+pX1 ≤ 0,
V s
1 + K1 ≥ V2,
(V s
1 + K1 − V2)[A(V s
1 + K1)+pX1]=0 ,
where the operator A is given by (13). Simple computations then lead to the following explicit
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is the critical output price level above which it is optimal to switch from project 1 to project
2. By (8) and (25), ps
12 >p 2. Intuitively, this is because the expected discounted gain from
switching from project 1 to project 2 is less than the expected discounted gain from investing
in project 2 starting from a situation where no project is in place, while the cost to the
decision-maker is the same.
10From (1) and (24), V s
1 (0) >V 2(0) and V s
1 (p) <V 2(p) for any p>p s
12.S i n c eV s
1 is convex,
with a slope that is everywhere smaller or equal than the constant slope of V2, there exists a
unique output price level ˜ ps <p s
12 such that V2(p) ≥ V s
1 (p)i fa n do n l yi fp ≥ ˜ ps.M o r e o v e r ,
since the slopes of V s
1 and V2 coincide only on [ps
12,∞), DV2(˜ ps) >D Vs
1 (˜ ps).
Remark. Coming back to problem (22), note that it is clearly suboptimal to invest in
project 1 when the current output price is above ps
12, since it would then be optimal to switch
immediately to project 2, and thus investing directly in project 2 is a dominant strategy. In
particular, since ps
12 >p 2, delaying investment in project 2 is pointless when the current
output price is above ps
12.
3.3 Constrained sequential investment
As a benchmark, it is useful to consider what would happen if the decision-maker were
constrained to invest in project 1 before investing in project 2. His investment problem can
then be written as:







t X1 dt − e−ρτ1K1 + e−ρτ2V2(Pp
τ2)
¸
; p ≥ 0. (26)
Here, τ1 denotes the ﬁr s tt i m ea tw h i c ht h ed e c i s i o n - m a k e ri n v e s t si np r o j e c t2 ,a n dτ2 ≥ τ1
denotes the ﬁrst time at which he invests in project 2. We solve (26) by dynamic programming
techniques. Given a current output price p, the value of investing in project 1, taking into
account the option to switch later to project 2, is V s
1 (p). Hence, in analogy with (10), it
is natural to consider the following auxiliary optimal stopping problem, in which the payoﬀ
function is given by V s
1 instead of V1:
Vs








; p ≥ 0. (27)
We have the following result.
Lemma 3.1 For any p ≥ 0, Vseq(p) ≤ Vs
1(p).
Our strategy for solving (26) is then as follows. First, we characterize the solution to
(27). Next, we exhibit stopping times τ1 and τ2 which achieve the payoﬀ Vs
1(p) in (26), and
are thus optimal given Lemma 3.1.
Compared to (10), the diﬃculty in (27) is that V s
1 is not aﬃne in the current output
price, reﬂecting the fact that V s
1 is itself an option value. One can nevertheless proceed in a
standard way by seeking a value function Vs
1 for (27) that is continuously diﬀerentiable on




1 ≥ V s
1 ,
(Vs
1 − V s
1 )AVs
1 =0 ,
where the operator A is given by (13). Simple computations show that the stopping region
Ss
1 = {p>0 |V s
1(p)=V s
1 (p)} for (27) is of the form [ps
1,∞), and that two cases can occur:


















In both cases, the value function Vs













1)i fp ≤ ps
1,
V s
1 (p)i f p>p s
1.
(30)
We can now exhibit stopping times that achieve the value Vs
1(p) in the sequential investment
problem (26), thereby verifying that Vseq(p)=Vs
1(p). In case (i), the optimal stopping times
are τ1 =i n f {t ≥ 0 | P
p
t ≥ ps
1} and τ2 =i n f {t ≥ 0 | P
p
t ≥ ps
12}.I f P0 <p s
12, investment is
sequential: it is optimal to invest in project 1 when the output price reaches ps
1,a n dt h e n
to wait until the output price reaches ps
12 to invest in project 2. Note that, in this case, the
optimal investment threshold ps
1 for project 1 is equal to p1 as given in (8). Thus investment
in project 1 is myopic, in the sense that it occurs at the same time than if the option of
switching to project 2 were not present, as in Leahy [22]. In case (ii), the optimal stopping
times are τ1 = τ2 =i n f{t ≥ 0 | P
p
t ≥ ps
1}, and the two investments occur simultaneously.
3.4 The optimal investment strategy
We are now in position to solve problem (22). As for (26), we adopt a dynamic programming
approach. Given a current output price p, the value of investing in project 1, taking into
account the option to switch later to project 2, is V s
1 (p). Hence, in analogy with (2) and (4),
it is natural to consider the upper envelope of V s
1 and V2:
V s(p)=m a x {V s
1 (p),V 2(p)}; p ≥ 0, (31)
and the following auxiliary optimal stopping problem:







; p ≥ 0. (32)
It should be noted that, in analogy with the basic model, V s is not diﬀerentiable at ˜ ps,w i t h
D+V s(˜ ps)=DV2(˜ ps) >D Vs
1 (˜ ps)=D−V s(˜ ps). We have the following result.
Lemma 3.2 For any p ≥ 0, Vswitch(p) ≤ Vs(p).
Our strategy for solving (22) is then as follows. First, we characterize the solution to
(32). Next, we exhibit stopping times τ1 and τ2 which achieve the payoﬀ Vs(p) in (22), and
are thus optimal given Lemma 3.2.
Let us denote by Ss = {p>0 |V s(p)=V s(p)} the stopping region for (32), and by
τSs =i n f {t ≥ 0 | P
p
t ∈ Ss} the associated stopping time. As for (4), τSs is an optimal
stopping time for (32) if Ss is non-empty. We have the following result.
12Proposition 3.1 The stopping region Ss for (32) is non-empty.
Proceeding as in Section 2, we ﬁrst rule out the relatively uninteresting case in which, no
matter the current output price, it is never optimal to invest in project 1 and 2 sequentially,
and τ1 = τ2 =i n f {t ≥ 0 | P
p
t ≥ p2} are optimal stopping times for (22). A necessary
and suﬃcient condition for this not to occur is that V s
1 (p) > V2(p)f o rs o m ep ≥ 0. Using
the explicit formulas (24) and (11) for V s
1 and V2, it is straightforward to verify that this






















which is weaker than (12). It should be noted that, because β > 1, (33) implies that K1/X1 <
K2/X2,s ot h a tp1 <p 2 by (8). In particular, one can check that (33) implies that V s
1 (p1) >
V2(p1) ≥ V2(p1), so that p1 < ˜ ps by deﬁnition of ˜ ps. Finally, in terms of the sequential
investment problem (26), we are in case (i), and thus ps
1 = p1.W eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gr e s u l t .
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that (33) holds. Then:
(i) The stopping region Ss for (32) is the union of two disjoint intervals [p1,p s
3] and [ps
4,∞),
where p1 is given by (8) and ps
3 < ˜ ps <p s
4;
(ii) The value function Vs for (32) is continuously diﬀerentiable on R++ and satisﬁes the
following variational inequalities:
AVs ≤ 0, (34)
Vs ≥ V s, (35)
(Vs − V )AVs =0 , (36)




















(iii) Vswitch = Vs and the optimal stopping times for (22) are:
τ1 =i n f {t ≥ 0 | P
p
t ∈ Ss},
τ2 =i n f
½





















13In analogy with Proposition 2.2, the bulk of the proof consists to show that the indiﬀerence
point ˜ ps never belongs to the optimal stopping region Ss. The remaining arguments closely
follow those used to prove Theorem 2.1.
As shown on Figure 2, the value function Vswitch coincides with Vseq on [0,p 1], then takes
oﬀ from V s
1 on (ps
3,p s
4) and touches down V2 at the point ps
4. On the interval [0,p 1], Vswitch
is of the form Bs


















can be easily computed from (24) and (30). On the interval [ps
3,p s
4], it follows from (34)—(36)
that Vswitch is of the form Aspα + Bspβ.T h ec o e ﬃcients As and Bs, as well as the critical
investment thresholds ps
3 and ps
4, can be found in principle by solving the value matching and
smooth-pasting conditions (37)—(40) although, as in the basic model, no analytic solution is
available.
–Insert Figure 2 here–
3.5 Discussion
In the basic model, the dichotomy of the investment region is not robust to a high volatility
of the output price process, as the option of investing in project 2 uniformly dominates the
payoﬀ of investing in project 1, and thus (12) is no longer satisﬁe d .T h i si sn ol o n g e rt h ec a s e
when one allows switching from project 1 to project 2. Indeed, the necessary and suﬃcient















Note that whenever σ goes to inﬁnity and thus β goes to 1, (41) becomes an equality. Next,
the derivative of the left-hand side of (41) with respect to β at β =1i s[ l n ( X1/X2) −
ln(K1/K2)]X1/X2 +ln(1−X1/X2)(1−X1/X2)w h i c hi sp o s i t i v ei fK1/X1 <K 2/X2 and X1
is close enough to X2. Under those circumstances, (41) still holds for β close to 1, and the
dichotomy of the investment region persists even if the output price process is highly volatile.
4 Concluding remarks
By focusing on the case of a single decision-maker, our analysis deliberately left aside the
strategic dimension of investment decisions. In practice, however, strategic considerations
are crucial factors of ﬁrms’ investment behavior that interact in a complex way with the real
options considerations emphasized in this paper (see for instance Grenadier [14], Weeds [27]
or Lambrecht and Perraudin [21]). It would be interesting to determine whether inaction
regions such as those we characterized may occur in equilibrium when ﬁrms compete by
choosing among alternative investment projects of diﬀerent sizes, corresponding for instance
to diﬀerent levels of capacity. This in turn raises the question of whether uncertainty will
make ﬁrms more likely to collude through their investment choices, as in Boyer, Lasserre,
Mariotti and Moreaux [5], or whether irreversibility of capital will make collusion harder to
sustain, as in Feuerstein and Gersbach [13]. These, and related questions must await for
future work.
14Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Since ρ >µ , the process {e−ρtP
p
t ;t ≥ 0} is a positive and continuous
supermartingale. In particular, it has a last element, namely 0. Hence, by the optional sam-
pling theorem (Karatzas and Shreve [18, Theorem 1.3.22]), E[e−ρτP
p
τ ] ≤ p for any stopping
time τ ∈ T P. Noting that there exist positive constants C1 and C2 such that V (p) ≤ C1p+C2











+ C2 ≤ C1p + C2
for any stopping time τ ∈ T P, and thus V(p) ≤ C1p+C2 for any p ≥ 0. It follows in particular
that V(p)i sw e l l - d e ﬁned and ﬁnite and, since ρ >µ , that the process {e−ρtV(P
p
t );t ≥ 0} is
uniformly integrable and converges almost surely to 0. According to optimal stopping theory,
the process {e−ρ(t∧τS)V(P
p
t∧τS);t ≥ 0} is a martingale (El Karoui [11]). Now, suppose that
S = ∅. Then the process {e−ρtV(P
p







≤ C1pe −(ρ−µ)t + C2e−ρt.
Since t is arbitrary and ρ >µ ,i tf o l l o w st h a tV is identically equal to 0, which is absurd as
V ≥ max{0,V 1,V 2}.T h u sS 6= ∅, as claimed. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Let us deﬁne the operator A by (13) and let f = V2 − V1.B y
construction, f is a diﬀerence of two aﬃne functions which satisﬁes f(˜ p)=0a n dDf (˜ p) > 0,
and we have V = V1 +max{f,0}.S i n c eV1 is of class C2 on R++, it follows from Itˆ o’s lemma


































t;t ≥ 0} is the local time for the continuous semimartingale P at ˜ p.W e t r e a t
each term on the right-hand side of this equation separately. For the second term, one has








¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ E
·Z t
0













[1 − e−(ρ−µ)t]+K1(1 − e−ρt).










15For the third term, note that there exists positive constants C1 and C2 such that |Af(p)| ≤








s ≥˜ p} ds
¸¯































































The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of this equality can be shown to be of order o(
√
t)b y





























































Since Df (˜ p) > 0, letting t tend to 0 yields that supτ∈T P E[e−ρτV (P
˜ p
τ )] >V(˜ p). Hence ˜ p does
not belong to the stopping region S. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2.1. (i) Let V1 and V2 be the option values for each project as deﬁned
by (10). It is easy to check from (8) that (12) and K1 <K 2 imply that p1 <p 2 and
V1(p1) >B 2p
β
1 = V2(p1). It follows that V 6= V2, and thus S ∩ [0, ˜ p] 6= ∅.M o r e o v e r , b y
Proposition 2.2, inf S < ˜ p. It is clear that for p<p 1, V(p) ≥ V1(p) >V 1(p), so that














where the ﬁrst equality follows from the fact that inf S < ˜ p, and the second from the deﬁnition
of p1.S i n c eV(p1) ≥ V1(p1), these quantities are in fact equal, and it follows that p1 ≥ inf S,
16as claimed. A similar argument establishes that S ∩ [0, ˜ p] is an interval [p1,p 3], and by
Proposition 2.2, p3 < ˜ p. We now prove that S ∩ [˜ p,∞) 6= ∅. If this were not the case, then



















where α is the negative root of the quadratic equation (5). For p large enough, (42) is violated,
and we obtain a contradiction. Let p4 =i n fS∩[˜ p,∞). By Proposition 2.2, p4 > ˜ p.M o r e o v e r ,
it is immediate that p4 ≥ p2, since otherwise waiting until the output price reaches p2 to invest
in project 2 would secure the decision-maker a strictly greater payoﬀ than investing in project
2 when the current value of the output price is p4. It then follows by an argument similar to
the one used to prove that p1 =i n fS that S ∩ [˜ p,∞)=[ p4,∞).
(ii) The variational inequalities (15)—(17) characterize V if V is diﬀerentiable (Øksendal
[25, Theorem 10.4.1]). We only need to prove this at the investment triggers p1, p3 and p4.
On [0,p 1], we clearly have V = V1,a n dt h ed i ﬀerentiability of V at p1 follows from a standard
smooth-pasting argument for problem (10). We now prove that DV(p3)=DV1(p3). Since
V ≥ V1 and V(p3)=V1(p3), we have, for any ε > 0,
V(p3 + ε) − V(p3)
ε
=
V(p3 + ε) − V1(p3)
ε
≥
V1(p3 + ε) − V1(p3)
ε
. (43)
Following Karatzas and Shreve [19, Lemma 7.8], let us introduce the stopping times T1
ε =
inf{t ≥ 0 | (p3 + ε)Ht ≤ p3} and T2
ε =i n f {t ≥ 0 | (p3 + ε)Ht ≥ p4},w h e r eHt =e x p ( ( µ −
σ2/2)t+σWt)f o re a c ht ≥ 0. The stopping time Tε = T1
ε ∧T2
ε is optimal whenever the initial
value of P is p3 + ε.T h e r e f o r e :
V(p3 + ε)=E
£




e−ρTε[V ((p3 + ε)HTε) − V (p3HTε)]
¤
,
where the inequality follows from the fact that Tε is not an optimal stopping time whenever



























Using standard results on the Laplace transform of the exit time of a Brownian motion on

























Using (43)—(44) and letting ε go to 0, we obtain that D+V(p3)=D+V1(p3), which implies
the result. The proof of the diﬀerentiability of V at p4 is similar, and therefore omitted. ¤
17P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . 1 .Consider two stopping times τ1,τ2 ∈ T P such that τ1 ≤ τ2. Then, using
the strong Markov property and the deﬁnition of V s









































The result follows then directly from comparing the objective functions in (26) and (27). ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . 2 . Consider two stopping times τ1,τ2 ∈ T P such that τ1 ≤ τ2. Then,














































from which the result follows by (32). ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 1 . The proof mimics that of Proposition 2.1, with V s
1 , V s and Vs
instead of V1, V and V. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3.1. (i) The ﬁrst step of the proof consists to show that ˜ ps 6∈ Ss.W e
proceed as in the proof of Proposition 2.2. Let fs = V2 − V s
1 . By construction, fs is
ad i ﬀerence of two convex functions which satisﬁes fs(˜ ps)=0a n dDf s(˜ ps) > 0, and we
have V s = V s
1 +m a x {fs,0}.S i n c e V s
1 is of class C2 on R++ \{ ps
12}, and its derivative is
absolutely continuous, it follows from the generalized Itˆ o formula (Krylov [20, §2.10]) and the
































18We treat each term on the right-hand side of this equation separately. For the second term,
since V s
1 is of class C2 on (0,p s
12), there exists a positive constant C1 such that |AV s
1 (p)| ≤ C1
for any p ∈ (0,p s
12). For p ∈ (ps
12,∞), AV s
1 (p)=−pX2 +ρ(K1 +K2). Hence, for every t ≥ 0,




1 (P ˜ ps
u )du
¸¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ E
·Z t
0
e−ρu ¯ ¯AV s













































Since Df s(˜ ps) > 0, letting t tend to 0 yields that supτ∈T P E[e−ρτV s(P
˜ ps
τ )] >Vs(˜ ps). Hence
˜ ps does not belong to the stopping region Ss. Next, as mentioned in the text, (33) implies
that V s
1 (p1) > V2(p1). It follows that Vs 6= V2, and thus Ss∩[0, ˜ ps] 6= ∅. The remaining of the
proof mimics that of Theorem 2.1(i), with V s
1 , Vs
1, Vs, Ss,˜ ps, ps
3 and ps
4 instead of V1, V1, V,
S,˜ p, p3 and p4.( N o t et h a tps
1 = p1 under (33).) The only point that requires modiﬁcation























Just as (42), (45) is violated for p large enough, which implies the desired result.
(ii) Noting that V1





4 instead of V1, V1, V, S,˜ p, p3 and p4.
(iii) It is immediate to check that the stopping times τ1 and τ2 yield the value Vs(p)i n
(22). Since Vswitch(p) ≤ Vs(p) for any p ≥ 0 by Lemma 3.2, the result follows. ¤
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Figure 1. The value function V
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Figure 2. The value function Vswitch
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12˜ p p3 p4 ∆
X2 =1 .9, K2 =4 0 1.333 0.948 1.727 9.4%
X2 =2 .9, K2 =9 0 1.684 0.886 2.493 29.8%
X2 =3 .9, K2 = 160 2.069 0.862 3.286 52.7%
Table 1. Numerical illustration for µ =0 ,ρ =0 .04, σ =0 .2, X1 =1a n dK1 =1 0